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The Still-Dwindled Revlon
Lyman Johnson* and Robert Ricca

+

Abstract
This is a brief Response to Professor Mohsen Manesh’s
extensive response to our original article, The Dwindling of
Revlon. Our thesis is that today the iconic Revlon doctrine is,
remedially, quite substantially diminished. Although Professor
Manesh sets out to establish what he calls “the limits of Johnson’s
and Ricca’s thesis,” we here maintain, as before, that there is little
remedial clout to Revlon unless directors or others very
significantly misbehave. We also criticize Delaware’s continuing
use of the standard-of-conduct/standard-of-review construct in
the fiduciary duty area. This rubric is unhelpful generally and
strikingly so in the Revlon setting, as we note.
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I. Introduction
We thank the Editors at the Washington and Lee Law Review
Online for inviting this Response. And of course we thank
Professor Mohsen Manesh for his extensive response1 to our
* Robert O. Bentley Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University
School of Law; Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas (Minneapolis) School
of Law.
+ Senior Corporate Counsel, Glu Mobile Inc.
1. Mohsen Manesh, Nearing 30, Is Revlon Showing Its Age?, 71 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. ONLINE 107 (2014).
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original article, where we argued that today the iconic doctrine
announced in Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.2 is,
remedially, quite substantially diminished.3 Professor Manesh
sets out to establish what he calls “the limits of Johnson and
Ricca’s thesis,”4 but we maintain in this Response, as before, that
there is little remedial clout to Revlon unless directors or others
very significantly misbehave. We believe Professor Manesh’s
various points serve only to underscore how unlikely it is that
Revlon will be the basis for judicial sanctions.
Although we did not set out in our original article to address
the liability exposure of advisers or corporate officers under
Revlon because they have no such direct exposure,5 we first
briefly respond to Professor Manesh’s arguments with respect to
those two types of defendants. We then turn to directors, our
central concern and the group most frequently sued for alleged
wrongdoing under Revlon.6
2. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
3. Lyman Johnson & Robert Ricca, The Dwindling of Revlon, 71 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 167 (2013).
4. Manesh, supra note 1, at 107.
5. When a sale of the company becomes inevitable, it is the role of the
directors that changes from “defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers
charged with getting the best price for stockholders.” Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
The board of directors is the governance body empowered as the gatekeeper in
approving a merger or other sale of the company. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§§ 251, 271 (2012) (giving the power to approve an agreement of a merger or
consolidation solely to the board of directors). To the extent officers are involved
in the negotiation and execution of a transaction to which Revlon would apply,
the officers must fulfill their traditional fiduciary duties of care and loyalty
when acting under the direction of the board in the sales process. See Revlon,
506 A.2d at 179 (reminding parties that the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty
apply with force during the merger process). Corporate officers have no
statutory responsibilities in the Revlon setting. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§§ 142, 251 (noting that corporate officers’ duties depend on the bylaws of a
corporation while the board of directors has explicit duties set forth in the
Delaware Code). It is the unique function of the board to act as the key decision
maker and protector of the stockholders in a sales process, not the corporate
officers qua officers. See id. § 251 (describing the duties of the board of directors
in a sales process but not mentioning any duties of corporate officers). Similarly,
while advisers must act pursuant to their agency law and contract duties, such
advisers are charged with no special duties under Revlon. See Revlon, 506 A.2d
at 179 (“The ultimate responsibility for managing the business and affairs of a
corporation falls on its board of directors.”).
6. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 3, at 189–90 (noting that Revlon does
not change the basic duties owed by directors but does trigger heightened
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II. Advisers; Aiding and Abetting

Professor Manesh rightly relates the “egregious facts” in the
recent Rural Metro7 decision.8 Much like the conflicted financial
adviser we described in the Del Monte9 case,10 the bank in Rural
Metro took “every opportunity to surreptitiously manipulate . . .
to advance its own interests.”11 But liability for outrageous, selfserving conduct that aids and abets a fiduciary duty breach,
although rare, certainly is not limited to the Revlon setting and is
not a distinctive attribute or outgrowth of Revlon responsibilities.
A bank—or anyone else—can be liable for aiding and abetting
any breach of fiduciary duty, including a breach of the duty of
care, in any setting. Such persons owe no direct fiduciary duties
under Revlon, or at all for that matter.
These cases remain so rare, moreover, because in all such
settings, the bank (or other actor) is liable only if it “knowingly
participates” in the misbehavior,12 a high hurdle that is more
demanding than the Revlon standard itself. Just how high can be
seen in a recent Chancery Court decision.13 In dismissing an
judicial scrutiny of director conduct); see also Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC
Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1993) (explaining that because the case
involved a sale of control, “[b]oard action in the circumstances presented here is
subject to enhanced scrutiny”).
7. In re Rural Metro Corp. S’holders Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014).
8. Manesh, supra note 1, at 131–32; see also In re Rural Metro Corp.
S’holders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 63–79 (Del. Ch. 2014) (recounting the complicated
factual scenario leading up to the litigation). On October 10, 2014, Vice
Chancellor Laster ordered the financial adviser—RBC Capital Markets LLC—to
pay $75.8 million in damages to the former shareholders of Rural Metro Corp.
Liz Hoffman, RBC Ordered to Pay $75.8 Million Over Conflicts Laws, WALL ST.
J. (Oct. 13, 2014, 9:37 A.M.), http://online.wsj.com/articles/rbc-ordered-to-pay-758-million-over-conflicts-lawsuit-1412975652 (last visited Nov. 1, 2014) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
9. 25 A.3d 813 (Del. Ch. 2011).
10. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 3, at 212 (describing the one instance
in which the Chancery Court granted injunctive relief on Revlon claims in the
pre-closing context in the past several years as involving a “conflicted financial
advisor”); Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 828 (finding that the selling company’s financial
adviser also providing buy-side financing and that this was an obvious conflict).
11. Manesh, supra note 1, at 131.
12. Rural Metro, 88 A.3d at 84–85, 96–100.
13. See Dent v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., No. 7950-VCP, 2014 WL 2931180, at
*17 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2014) (“Dent faces a heavy burden in arguing that
Cypress knowingly participated in any breaches of fiduciary duty . . . .”).
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aiding and abetting claim against a financial adviser, the vice
chancellor noted that evidence of arm’s-length bargaining by the
two companies in a sales process necessarily negates an aiding
and abetting claim because it utterly precludes a showing of
knowing participation.14 Thus, plaintiffs, the court observed, face
a “heavy burden” in these types of cases.15
But the burden in a Revlon setting can be heavier yet where,
as in Rural Metro, the directors are not defendants in the case
because then the plaintiff must also prove that the directors
breached a fiduciary duty.16 This leaves the plaintiff, not the
defendants, with all the burdens—very high ones—in a long-shot
aiding and abetting claim.17 Rural Metro is a cautionary tale for
egregiously conflicted financial advisers, but, from a remedies
perspective, it is a distinct outlier. These types of claims may
arise in Revlon settings—where they typically fail—but they are
not uniquely Revlon duty claims, and they do not “limit” our
thesis.
III. Corporate Officers
As with aiders and abettors, corporate officers may have
liability in Revlon settings—although this seems nonexistent to
date18—but not because of officer breaches of Revlon duties as
such. As we noted in our earlier piece, officers already face
greater liability risk than directors because they cannot be
14. See id. (describing the Chancery Court’s consistent position that
evidence of arm’s-length negotiation with fiduciaries negates a claim of aiding
and abetting).
15. Id.
16. See In re Rural Metro, 88 A.3d at 84–85 (“By choosing to settle with the
directors and continue only with the aiding and abetting claim, the plaintiffs
took up the burden of proof on each of the elements of aiding and abetting,
including the existence of a fiduciary breach.”).
17. See, e.g., Houseman v. Sugarman, No. 8897-VCG, 2014 WL 1478511, at
*15 (Del. Ch. Apr. 16, 2014) (dismissing Revlon claims against directors and
aiding and abetting claims against financial adviser).
18. The 2014 case described by Professor Manesh involves two officers and
remains ongoing. See Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 693 (Del. Ch.
2014) (granting and denying in part the motion for summary judgment). To our
knowledge, no court has imposed judicial sanctions on an officer qua officer for
failing to discharge Revlon-related responsibilities.
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exculpated.19 This is as it should be.20 What Revlon does is set a
stiffer standard for corporate directors in the merger and sale
context, but as we point out, remedially, the cases rarely impose
sanctions on directors.21
One critical mistake directors can and do make—albeit more
rarely today than in the past, one hopes—is to permit executive
officers to play a central and insufficiently supervised role in the
sales process. The cases cited by Professor Manesh involved
boards of directors allowing senior officers—with obvious conflicts
of interests—to negotiate corporate sales.22 Of course, the officers,
upon being careless, disloyal, or both in discharging their
delegated (or acquiesced in) functions in such settings, face
liability exposure, but not because of Revlon as such. Officers qua
officers have no independent obligations under Revlon. They only
have those, if any, derived from the board of directors, the
governance body that should drive the sale process. It is the
directors who theoretically—but do not in actuality, we show—
face the risk of sanctions for mishandling their Revlon
responsibilities. In any event, actual liability of officers in the
Revlon setting appears, based on reported decisions, to be even
rarer than for directors. Vice Chancellor Laster, in the ChenAnderson decision referenced by Professor Manesh, cited an
article by Professor Johnson and observed that Delaware law on
officer liability is unresolved.23 This stems from the fact that
there are so few Delaware decisions addressing officer liability in
any fashion, much less imposing sanctions. To date, officers, like
directors, have faced low Revlon-related risk.

19. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 3, at 206 (“Thus, while corporate
officers remain personally liable for duty of care breaches, directors generally
face only injunctive and other equitable remedies for such breaches.”).
20. See Lyman Johnson & Robert Ricca, Reality Check on Officer Liability,
67 BUS. LAW. 75, 75 (2011) (arguing that a stricter duty of care for officers is
more realistic and theoretically sound).
21. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 3, at 218 (describing the “low
likelihood of a remedial sanction under Revlon”).
22. See Manesh, supra note 1, at 126 n.105, 128 n.117, 129 n.126 (citing
various cases that involved boards of directors enabling executive officers to
negotiate mergers and acquisitions).
23. See Chen, 87 A.3d at 666 n.2 (acknowledging the “lively debate”
surrounding officer liability).

THE STILL-DWINDLED REVLON

155

IV. Directors; Rare Remedies
Of the two key judicial opinions discussed by Professor
Manesh, one involved no directors and the other granted the
independent directors summary judgment. And in the two
subsequent decisions we noted above, the Chancery Court
granted the directors’ motions to dismiss.24 Thus, as we posited in
our original piece, directors face a very low likelihood of judicial
sanction.25 That plaintiffs now pursue other quarry, such as
conflicted advisers and careless or disloyal officers, shows just
how challenging it is to obtain sanctions against disinterested,
independent directors.
But Professor Manesh helpfully asks us to remember
something about bad-faith claims in the Revlon setting. Bad faith
is not limited to the “conscious disregard” of duty claim found in
Lyondell,26 but can include subjective bad faith. In fact, and we
cited Disney which emphasized just this,27 the traditional or
“classic, quintessential bad faith” theory is subjective bad faith.
But subjective bad-faith claims of the type touted by Professor
Manesh require an intent to do harm, as Lyondell and Disney
note.28 That is, such a claim requires intentionally acting with a
24. See Manesh, supra note 1, at 128 (explaining that “the chancery court
granted summary judgment dismissing the Revlon claims made against Occam’s
outside directors”); Dent v. Ramtrol Int’l Corp., No. 7950-VCP, 2014 WL
2931180, at *13 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2014) (discussing that the plaintiffs’ must
meet their evidentiary burden).
25. See Ariel Yehezel & Amanda Zablocki, Fiduciary Duties in the Context
of Dent v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., MARTINDALE.COM (Sept. 2, 2014),
http://www.martindale.com/corporate-law/article_Sheppard-Mullin-RichterHampton-LLP_2177584.htm (last updated Sept. 10, 2014) (last visited Oct. 30,
2014) (“The difficulty of winning a Revlon claim has been proven time and time
again . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
26. See Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 240 (Del. 2009)
(discussing the Chancellor’s definition of bad faith as an “intentional dereliction
of duty, a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities”).
27. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 3, at 208 (addressing the Delaware
court’s view of bad faith); see also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906
A.2d 27, 64–66 (Del. 2006) (discussing the role of intent in relevant bad-faith
standards).
28. See Lyondell, 970 A.2d at 240 (discussing the court’s view of bad faith
as “encompass[ing] not only an intent to harm but also an intentional dereliction
of duty”); Disney, 906 A.2d at 64–66 (describing subjective bad faith as
“motivated by an actual intent to do harm”).

156

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 150 (2014)

purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the
corporation (or stockholders, in Revlon).29 As a matter of history,
it was a sustained failure by plaintiffs to garner judgments on a
traditional subjective bad-faith theory that led so famously in
Disney, and thereafter in Lyondell, to the “conscious disregard”
facet of bad faith. Importantly, however, conscious or deliberate
wrongdoing is required both for Lyondell conscious-disregard
bad-faith claims and classic subjective bad-faith claims. Those
high scienter requirements are very demanding hurdles to clear,
and we believe disinterested, independent directors have little to
fear, remedially, on either front. The Chen case discussed by
Professor Manesh serves exactly to support this point because
outside directors there were granted summary judgment,
notwithstanding the assertion of a subjective bad-faith claim.
The Chen case warrants comment for two other reasons not
raised by Professor Manesh, however, and we do so only very
briefly here, although the points deserve greater elaboration. As
he did in his recent Revlon article,30 Vice Chancellor Laster
deploys in Chen the divergent standard-of-conduct/standard-ofreview rubric31 that we criticize in our original piece.32 He
explains that the standard of judicial review—which under
Revlon is an enhanced, intermediate standard—is more
“forgiving” than the standard of conduct, which pertains to the
director duties of care and loyalty.33 We continue to find this
analytical construct to be puzzling as seen in Chen itself, a case
in a summary judgment posture.
29. See Lyondell, 970 A.2d at 240 (discussing the intent requirements in
bad-faith standards found in Delaware case law); Disney, 906 A.2d at 64–66
(looking at different categories of conduct and noting that bad faith requires
intent to harm).
30. See J. Travis Laster, Revlon Is a Standard of Review: Why It’s True and
What It Means, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 5, 26 (2013) (distinguishing the
standard of conduct from the standard of review).
31. See Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 666–67 (Del. Ch. 2014)
(noting that Delaware corporate law distinguishes between the standard of
conduct and the standard of review).
32. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 3, at 210 n.233 (discussing and
criticizing the supposed divergent standards of conduct and review in
Delaware).
33. See Chen, 87 A.3d at 667 (describing the standard of review as “more
forgiving of directors and more onerous for stockholder plaintiffs than the
standard of conduct”).
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Vice Chancellor Laster draws an inference in Chen that the
directors may have behaved unreasonably in how they handled
the corporate sale process, thus possibly failing the
“reasonableness” review standard of Revlon.34 Yet Vice
Chancellor Laster goes on to grant the outside directors summary
judgment because the plaintiffs failed to cite evidence to support
an inference of bad faith. He observed that speculation as to an
improper motive is not enough.35 Thus, although the directors
failed at this stage to meet the supposedly more “forgiving”
Revlon standard of review, they succeeded in resisting liability
and gaining summary judgment.
For plaintiffs, this, at best, was a truly pyrrhic victory.
Perhaps Vice Chancellor Laster is introducing yet a third
standard here—i.e., a standard of liability—that, unlike the
standard of conduct, is more demanding than the standard of
review, not less. If so, one then wonders what role the “standard
of conduct” notion even plays in Delaware corporate law, being
neither, apparently, a liability standard nor a standard of review.
Indeed, one wonders, more generally, in what respect it is “law”
at all. But that is for another day.
In any event, Chen splendidly shows how directors today can
fail the Revlon standard and yet incur no liability. Thus, this
decision bolsters rather than “limits” our thesis of Revlon’s
diminished remedial significance. We think, more generally, that
the standard of conduct/standard of review rubric is unhelpful in
fiduciary duty analysis and strikingly so in the Revlon setting.
Chen highlights this.
Relatedly, the parties’ burdens in a Revlon case remain
murky. More clearly than in many cases, Vice Chancellor Laster
assigned to directors the burden to show they had met the Revlon
standard and to show, in seeking exculpation, that they breached
only the duty of care.36 But he emphasized, in granting all outside
directors summary judgment, that plaintiffs did not cite or
provide evidence to support an inference of subjective bad faith.
34. See id. at 672–76 (discussing the ways in which the defendant-directors’
conduct may have been unreasonable).
35. See id. at 685 (discussing plaintiff’s lack of evidence to demonstrate bad
faith through improper motive).
36. See id. at 666 (explaining the defendants’ claim that they “at most
breached their duty of care”).
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Thus, as we contended in our original article,37 notwithstanding
ostensible director Revlon burdens, whether in seeking
preliminary injunctions or money damages, plaintiffs must meet
customary burdens to produce evidence. And, quite separate and
apart from the narrow Revlon standard itself, because the
standards for obtaining injunctions or money damages are so
high in lawsuits against Delaware directors,38 today they face a
substantially dwindled likelihood of being remedially sanctioned
under Revlon.39 They may (and should), on advice of counsel, seek
37. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 3, at Part IV.A–B (discussing the
burden of proof on plaintiffs and directors).
38. See id. (explaining the high burden on plaintiffs to successfully bring a
claim against investors). Professor Manesh believes it is not the high burden of
obtaining an injunction in the Revlon context that has resulted in so few
injunctions in recent years. Instead, he puts forward a “boy scout” theory of
director behavior, where directors are so diligent in complying with their Revlon
duties that there are few cases of problematic behavior for the courts to address.
See Manesh, supra note 1, at 136–41 (arguing that “Revlon’s shareholderfocused fiduciary mandate has seeped beyond its specific transactional
boundaries and found its way into every corporate decision”). As support,
Professor Manesh cites the Delaware Chancery Court’s denial of injunctions for
a lack of probability of success on the merits in the Revlon setting in eleven out
of the fifteen reported cases that we reviewed in our Article over the past six
calendar years. Manesh, supra note 1, at 138–39. We find this argument
lacking. The one transaction in the past six calendar years where the Chancery
Court did grant an injunction in the Revlon context is telling. The injunction
granted by the court was a mere twenty-day delay in the holding of the
shareholder vote to approve the transaction despite a sales process where the
seller’s investment bank was operating on both sides of the deal, and in fact
received significantly more consideration in the deal from the buyer for
providing buy-side financing than it received from the seller as the seller’s
advisor in the sale, and despite the fact that the buyer in the transaction was an
amalgamation of two former bidders for the company who teamed up in direct
violation of prior agreements with the seller prohibiting such collusion. See In re
Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 817–18, 844 (Del. Ch. 2011)
(setting out the facts pursuant to the plaintiffs’ claims). It takes very, very
problematic behavior to obtain an injunction in the Revlon setting.
39. Even in the Del Monte case, Vice Chancellor Laster flatly stated:
To hold that the Del Monte directors breached their fiduciary duties
for purposes of granting injunctive relief does not suggest, much less
preordain, that the directors face a meaningful threat of monetary
liability. On this preliminary record, it appears that the Board sought
in good faith to fulfill its fiduciary duties, but failed because it was
misled by Barclays. Unless further discovery reveals different facts,
the one-two punch of exculpation under Section 102(b)(7) and full
protection under Section 141(e) makes the chances of a judgment for
money damages vanishingly small.
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ex ante to comply with the supposed stricture of Revlon, as we
observed,40 but only extraordinary and intentional misconduct
will carry any remedial consequences.

Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 817–18, 844. In his next sentence, the Vice Chancellor
went on: “The same cannot be said for the self-interested aiders and abetters.”
Id. at 818. Vice Chancellor Laster appears to be trying to squeeze some utility
out of this diminished doctrine, but one wonders if this is a particularly helpful
(remedial) use of Revlon, and more importantly for plaintiffs, perhaps there are
better claims to bring against such conflicted advisers, including claims for a
breach of the adviser’s own stricter agency law duties, fraud claims, or breach of
contract claims.
40. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 3, at 215–17 (discussing the ex ante
role of Revlon in lawyer advice to directors in the sale context).

